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INTRODUCTION

There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a
stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalnessof
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2015, St. Mary's University School of Law. I
would like to thank Professors Schleuter and Reamey for their assistance in preparing this
Comment.
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that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the
accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against selfincrimination.1
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself." 2 Embedded in the Fifth Amendment,3 the privilege
against self-incrimination reaches "to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence." 4 Privilege against self-incrimination provides a rare constitutional exception to the historical principal that the
public has a right to every man's evidence.'
The language of Miranda v. Arizona popularized the privilege's application against self-incrimination during police questioning as the "right to
remain silent." 6 The U.S. Supreme Court's attempted balancing two contradictory interests in Miranda.' First, the Supreme Court sought to preserve law enforcement's interest in soliciting confessions through
interrogation.' Second, the Court balanced this interest with an individual's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.'
Some scholars consider Miranda's effort in balancing the two interests
a complete failure.'o Since Miranda, the right to remain silent has continued to puzzle our judiciary, leading to conflicting decisions." The right
1. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
2. U.S. CONs-r. amend. V.

3. Id.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
5. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 674 (1972) (reinforcing the long-standing
principle).
6. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (using the now-popular phrase "the right to remain
silent").
7. See Mary Strauss, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right
to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & MARY Bi Ris. J. 773, 773 (2009) (identifying
two interests the Supreme Court considered).
8. Id.
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439 (acknowledging the need to afford an individual Fifth
Amendment protection); Strauss, supra note 7.
10. See George C. Thomas, III, Miranda's Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 Ti~x. L. Riev. 1091, 1091 (2003) (classifying the Court's decision as a "failure of liberal activism"); see also Strauss, supra note 7 (criticizing Miranda as a
"spectacular failure").
11. Compare Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (narrowing the protection of the right to remain silent by requiring a defendant to "claim it"), and Salinas v.
Texas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-78 (2013) (allowing the prosecution to comment
on a defendant's silence during questioning), with Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615
(1965) (broadening the interpretation of the privilege by prohibiting the prosecution from
commenting on a defendant's unwillingness to take the stand at trial), and Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S 441, 461 (1972) (observing the privilege usually acts to allow an
individual to remain silent when any question requires an incriminatory answer).
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to remain silent persists as a topic of constant litigation fifty years after
Miranda.12 Differing legal interpretations concerning self-incrimination
still haunt the Supreme Court.
The decision in Salinas v. Texas divided nine Supreme Court Justices
over the correct application of the right to remain silent.14 Moreover, the
Supreme Court's ruling in Salinas perplexed many respected scholars in
the legal community." The plurality held the right to remain silent could
not be exercised by silence; thus, the plurality mandated that the individual "expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response
to the officer's question."16 Proposing to constrain the privilege even further, the concurring opinion called for abandoning the previous decision
in Griffin v. Minnesota, which stood for nearly half a century.' 7 The dissent argued defendants, by their silence, exercise their constitutional right
against self-incrimination." The plurality's seemingly counterintuitive
holding has further muddied the already murky waters of our existing
body of law on the right to remain silent."
What remains after the decision in Salinas is a convoluted holding placing an undue burden on individuals, including certain groups already disadvantaged due to lack of mental capacity, education, and proficiency of
the English language, instead of placing the burden on the government,
which is better equipped to understand the nuances of the law.2 0 Existing
law only further cripples innocent defendants, while guilty defendants
12. See Joshua 1. Hammack, Comment, Turning Miranda Right Side Up: Post-Waiver
Invocations and the Need to Update Miranda Warnings, 87 NOrRMI DAME, L. Riy. 421, 421
(2011) (detailing how the right to remain silent remains the subject of frequent litigation).
13. See generally Salinas, 563 U.S.
, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (illustrating an example
of how the right to remain silent continues to be litigated with differing opinions).
14. See generally id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2174 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Silence is not Golden, Supreme Court
Says, ABA JOURNAL (June 25, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemrinsky-silence-is-notgolden-supremescourt-says (criticizing the Supreme Court's
holding as oxymoronic).
16. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013). The Supreme Court concluded
the defendant's right to remain silent claim is meritless because the right to remain silent
was not expressly invoked. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013).
17. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (prohibiting the prosecution from commenting on a
defendant not testifying at trial).
18. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2191 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
19. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15 (referring to the Court's holding as "oxymoronic"); see also Khaled Mowad, The Right to Remain Silent After Salinas v. Texas,
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Riv. (June 21, 2013), http://harvardcrcl.org/2013/06/21/the-right-to-re
main-silent-after-salinas-v-texas (recognizing many commentators agree the holding in
Salinas will only complicate existing case law).
20. See Tim Lynch, Salinas v. Texas, CAro INsr0rrrE (June 17, 2013 11:46 PM), http://
www.cato.org/blog/salinas-v-texas (identifying the glaring error in Salinas that places the
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may still escape untethered. 2 Requiring specific invocation necessitating
direct speech serves to single out and impair certain groups within
society.22
This case is significant because certain groups are already disadvantaged by an unfavorable system, 23 and Salinas only exacerbates disadvantages facing these minorities. 24 The holding places the burden completely
upon a person who is likely incompetent in navigating Miranda's the intricacies.2 5 The central problems with the holding in Salinas concern the
lack of precision in identifying whether an individual is in a position to
invoke the right and the language needed in order to invoke that right.
Current Fifth Amendment jurisprudence should be altered, clearing
confusion and easing burdens disproportionately shifted to individual witnesses. 26 Clear and concise warnings allowing an individual to make an
informed decision about whether to speak or remain silent ensures those
with mental disabilities and other disadvantages are treated fairly and are
not coerced into unwittingly providing evidence of guilt. 27 This serves the
Fifth Amendment's original purpose.
Once an individual knows how to invoke this right, opportunity to do
so without conjuring magical language. 28 Refined interrogation standards will also benefit the prosecution by ensuring statements obtained

burden on a person not the government); see also Mowad, supra note 19 (articulating the

potential dangers to disadvantaged persons).
21. See Akhil Reed Amar & Ren6e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The
Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Micil. L. Rev. 857, 860-61 (1995) (explaining under current
interpretations of the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, innocent defendants
are not helped but harmed).
22. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261 (1994).
23. See id. (examining how Miranda rights serve to single out certain members of
society).
24. See Lynch, supra note 20 (implying the holding will have dangerous impacts on
disadvantaged persons). Classes of disadvantaged persons affected by the holding include
those that are intoxicated, suffering from mental health issues, speak limited English, and
lack education. Id.
25. Id.; see also Mowad, supra note 19 (articulating that a danger lies in creating a
distinction between pre- and post-arrest interrogations when discussing the burden).
26. See Hammack, supra note 12 (proposing remedies to the current confusion of Miranda, such as, but not limited to, a reconsideration of the use of clarifying questions during interrogation).
27. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1940) (recognizing testimony can be
coerced not only through physical methods, but also through mental stresses such as protracted questioning without right to counsel). The Supreme Court discusses how methods
of both physical and mental torture have historical roots in destroying the innocent. Id. at
237.
28. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15 (insinuating the Salinas holding requires an individual to utter magic words). Specifically, Chemerinsky states the holding is divorced from
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will be admissible. The Supreme Court must reexamine Miranda warnings to restore the very principles Miranda sought to protect, and Salinas

extinguished. 2 9
I.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: PAST VS. PRESENT

There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the doctrine that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify
against himself had reached its full development in the common law,
was there considered as resting on the law of nature, and was embedded in that system as one of its great and distinguishingattributes.30
There are many articles recounting the Fifth Amendment's formulation, tracing its roots to the early 1500s." A complete history and analysis of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence is outside the scope of this
Comment. Rather, this Comment will look at specific Fifth Amendment
principals and their relation to the multiple opinions in Salinas, while
contrasting earlier, more liberal Fifth Amendment constructions with
more recent decisions.
A.

The Undercard: Early Decisions on the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination

Early Supreme Court cases attempting to resolve issues raised by the
Fifth Amendment skewed in favor of the individual.3 2 In this section,
three Supreme Court decisions of the late 1800s-relied upon by Mireality and is reinstating a policy the court expressly moved away from in previous opinions. Id.
29. See Hammack, supra note 12 (proposing remedies to the current confusion of Miranda, such as, but not limited to, a reconsideration of the use of clarifying questions during interrogation).
30. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897).
31. See, e.g., LeONARD W. Levy, ORIGINS OF TIE FIFrii AMLENDMENT: TInE Riciff
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (providing an overview of the

Fifth Amendment's origins by an examination of its foundations from Elizabethan times to
the establishment of the American colonies); Albert W. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 Mici-i. L. Ri'v. 2625, 2631 (1996)
(noting, historically, this right may have arisen from the religious obligation of confession);
John A. Kemp, The Background of the Fifth Amendment in English Law: A Study of its
Historical Implications, I WM. & MARY L. RE'v. 247, 247-48 (1958) (stating the right
against self-incrimination developed from the fifteenth century's insistence the accused testify, which was a departure from medieval legal principles).
32. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896) (writing any possibility of legal
peril is enough to warrant protection); see also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698,
(1944) ("The immediate and potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any
difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and
prosecution of crime.").
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randa-will be examined in providing context for current law concerning
the right to remain silent.33
In Counselman v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court dealt with a witnessnot a named defendant-who refused to answer grand jury questions
based on Fifth Amendment grounds. 3 4 The lower court ruled Counselman could only invoke Fifth Amendment protection in a criminal case
against himself.35 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding the
Fifth Amendment should be broadly constructed broadly in preventing a
person from being compelled to become a witness against himself in any
criminal case.36 Such broad construction arguably created a situation
where any witness may claim silence if the answer would tend to incriminate or expose themselves to fines, penalties, or forfeitures, regardless of
who the defendant is at trial.
While limited to criminal matters, the privilege should be interpreted
as broadly "as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."3 Almost
seventy years later in Miranda, the Supreme Court directly quoted Counselman, upholding its principles and retaining liberal construction favoring individuals.
In decisions like Counselman, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the detriment imposed on a witness during interrogation,
often siding in favor of protecting civil liberties.40
This conception survived into the next century. Justice Frankfurter
noted, "the Bill of Rights was added to the original Constitution in the
conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered
enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social

33. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (citing several nineteenth
century Supreme Court cases to support its holding); see also Bram, 168 U.S. at 532 (interpreting the Fifth Amendment's right to self-incrimination, thus providing a framework for
the Supreme Court in Miranda);Brown, 161 U.S. at 591 (interpreting same); Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 547 (1892) (interpreting the same).
34. See Counselman, 142 U.S. at 549-50 (elaborating Counselman declined answering
to avoid incriminating himself for shipping grain below the required tariff on certain
railways).
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. at 562 (holding a witness may claim silence as to any question that may incriminate him, whether in a criminal proceeding or civil proceeding).
37. Id. at 563-64 (regarding the privilege as an ancient principle).
38. Id. at 562.
39. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966) (choosing not to depart from
the noble heritage promulgated by the Supreme Court in Counselman).
40. See id. at 461 (implementing the Fifth Amendment standard as set forth in Bram);
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897) (excluding a confession as evidence because it was involuntary and finding any doubt as to whether the confession was voluntary
should be examined in favor of the accused); Brown, 161 U.S. at 600 (presupposing the
legal detriment is placed upon those who are being questioned); Counselman, 142 U.S. at
562 (giving the Fifth Amendment a broad interpretation).
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objects of a free society should not be sacrificed." 41 These early cases
recognized when an individual is compelled to explain his alleged association with a crime, investigators may unfairly press the witness, paint the
witness into a corner, and entrap the witness into fatal contradictions. 42
Because of this potential harm, our nation's founders directly incorporated the old English maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare ("no man is
bound to accuse himself") into our Constitution by ratifying the Fifth
Amendment. 43
Unlike more recent cases, early American jurisprudence recognized
broad Fifth Amendment interpretation.44 Another case cited in Miranda
was Brown v. Walker.45 In Brown, the Supreme Court faced a conflict
between a statute requiring all persons subpoenaed by the Interstate
Commerce Commission to testify and the Fifth Amendment, which protects an individual from being a witness against himself. 46 The ultimate
question before the Supreme Court was whether the statute adequately
incorporated the Fifth Amendment's protection.4 7
Brown struggled with the proposition that, if construed literally, one
might interpret the Fifth Amendment as meaning any witness could abstain from revealing any facts potentially leading to incriminating and unfavorable comments. 48 The majority speculated an overly broad
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment would allow any witness to refuse

41. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489 (1944). Feldman's central holding is
its determination that the Fifth Amendment allows admissions made in a state court case
to be used against an individual in a federal court, even if the admission was compelled
under a state immunity statute and no federal officers participated in the testimony. Id. at
487.
42. Brown, 161 U.S. at 596 (detailing early concerns that prompted the need for the
privilege against self-incrimination).
43. Id. (explaining the maxim originated in protest against inquisitional methods and
had a stronger effect in England when the Stuarts left the throne).
44. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (declaring a liberal construction in Fifth Amendment cases is particularly warranted); Brown, 161 U.S. at 599 (noting
great latitude is allotted to a witness when responding to questioning); Counselman, 142
U.S. at 562 (explaining the privilege must have a broad interpretation in favor of the right
it is intended to protect). But see Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178, 2183
(2013) (ruling express invocation is necessary and forfeiture can be made unknowingly);
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381, 384 (2010) (holding the invocation must be
unambiguous and an implicit waiver is sufficient in denying individuals their Fifth Amendment rights).
45. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (citing Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896)).
46. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 593-94 (1896) (discussing the need to balance
the Fifth Amendment with an act of Congress).
47. See id. at 595 (asking whether the statute as applied in the case sufficiently satisfied the constitutional guarantee of protection).
48. Id.
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to testify for any reason. 49 For this reason, the Majority used a more
realistic interpretation, construing the clause for a practical and beneficent purpose.o
The Supreme Court was not attempting protection of an individual
against every possible injury resulting from their testimony, but rather
reconciling the statute with fundamental law basics.5 ' Contrasting with
current opinions, the Brown decision afforded great latitude to the witness in reasoning for himself the impact of the statements given. 52 Today,
the government determines whether a witness's responses fall under Fifth
Amendment protection.
The Counselman and Brown decisions considered witness statements in
grand jury proceedings.5 4 However, another early decision, Bram v.
United States ss extended privilege to statements made outside the courtroom. 56 The Bram holding extends Fifth Amendment protection regardless of where the interrogation occurs.57 Brain was a seaman accused by
his co-defendant of murdering his captain.5 ' The prosecution construed
statements made by Brain to an investigator as a confession because
Brain did not specifically deny the allegations during questioning.59

49. See id. (discussing various interpretations of the Fifth Amendment).
50. See id. at 596 (1896) (applying the right against self-incrimination in a more useful
and beneficial manner by harmonizing the law with the Constitution).
51. See id. (distinguishing the analysis and application of the statute with the
Constitution).
52. Compare Brown, 161 U.S. at 599 (noting great latitude is afforded to a witness),
with Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178, 2183 (2013) (ruling express invocation is necessary and forfeiture can be made unknowingly), and Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259, 2261 (2010) (holding the invocation must be unambiguous and an implicit waiver is sufficient in denying individuals their Fifth Amendment
rights).
53. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) ("A witness' constitutional
right to refuse to answer questions depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need to
know those reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim.").
54. See Brown, 161 U.S. at 609 (dealing with statements made in a grand jury proceeding); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 548 (1892) (concerning statements by a witness in a grand jury proceeding, which were later excluded on Fifth Amendment grounds).
55. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 528 (1966) (citing Bram's decision to reach
the conclusion that statements made to police officers are covered under the Fifth
Amendment).
57. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) ("[Wlherever a question arises
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that
portion of the [Flifth [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States commanding
that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.").
58. See id. at 534-36 (reciting the factual background of the case).
59. See id. at 561-62 (recanting the prosecution's attempt to admit Bram's statements
as evidence of a confession).
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Rather, Bram answered, "He could not have seen me. . . he could not see
me from there." 60 The Supreme Court-through a thorough analysis of
English and American law-found Brain's statements were compelled
and involuntary, thus inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. 6 1
Almost fifty years after the Counselman, Brown, and Bram decisions,
the Supreme Court expanded these early principles, including not only
answers directly supporting a potential conviction but also-in limited
circumstances-any response which "would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime." 62 In such
instances, the Supreme Court has also ruled a witness should not be required to prove why certain answers would be hazardous.63 The following section will more thoroughly examine these and other holdings
involving the privilege's invocation.
B.

Rolling with the Punches: Decisions of the 1940s and 1950s and the
Requirement of Claiming the Privilege

Familiarity with 1940s and 1950s 5th Amendment jurisprudence is vital
in understanding why the Salinas plurality held the privilege was not expressly invoked.6" During the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court began
placing the burden of claiming the Fifth Amendment protection on the
witness. 65 Some Supreme Court decisions continued application of a liberal interpretation,6 6 but others limited the privilege.6 7

60. Id. at 539.
61. See id. at 565 (concluding Bram's statements were inadmissible because "the accused could not bring out, by way of cross-examination, everything which took place at the
time of the alleged confession, but was compelled, in order to do so, to make the detective
his own witness, and therefore be placed in the position where he could not impeach
him").
62. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (reaffirming the principle
that the privilege extends to any link in the chain of evidence, not just to answers themselves); see also Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 365 (1917) (limiting the protection to
instances where there was reasonable cause to expect danger from a direct answer).
63. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 (rejecting the idea that a witness must disclose why
they are claiming Fifth Amendment protection).
64. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (deciding that in
response to a police officer's questions, the defendant did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination).
65. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951) ("If petitioner desired the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, she was required to claim it.");
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (asserting that the privilege must be
claimed).
66. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955) (continuing the liberal construction of the Fifth Amendment); see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 582
(1892) (applying the liberal construction more than fifty years before Quinn).
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The two main strategies employed by the judiciary in limiting a witness'
use of the Fifth Amendment are narrowing the scope of the privilege itself and broadly applying the doctrine of waiver. 68 More commonly referred to as "failing to claim the privilege," the doctrine of waiver has
been increasingly phased out since these cases. 69 Several of these Fifth
Amendment cases occurred because of government inquiries into
whether certain individuals held ties to the Communist Party.7 0 Mostly
involving federal grand jury proceedings, the same standards for determining Fifth Amendment privileges on the federal level have been selectively incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment into state
proceedings." Although the 1940s and 1950s cases held one must claim
the privilege, no standard or rule was promulgated for when the privilege
must be claimed, or what actions must be undertaken to successfully invoke Fifth Amendment protections.7 2
United States v. Monia7 ' dealt with claiming the privilege in conjunction with immunity granted by the Sherman Act.7 4 The Supreme Court

67. See Rogers, 340 U.S. at 370 (holding if individuals desire the protection against
self-incrimination, they must claim it); see also Monia, 317 U.S. at 427 (asserting the privilege must be claimed in order for the testimony to be viewed as compulsory).
68. See Rogers, 340 U.S. at 376 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision to apply the doctrine of waiver broadly and find the witness could not be afforded
Fifth Amendment protection).
69. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 427 (1984) (writing the "vague term" of
waiver has been abandoned and the witness instead is said to have failed to claim the
privilege).
70. See, e.g., Rogers, 340 U.S. at 368 (examining the case of an individual alleged to be
the treasurer of the Communist Party of Denver); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159,
159-60 (1950) (reversing a finding of contempt against Patricia Blau for refusing to answer
questions regarding her employment by the Communist Party of Colorado); Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (reversing a ruling of contempt against Irving Blau for
refusing to answer questions regarding his wife's whereabouts and his employment by the
Communist Party of Colorado); Quinn, 349 U.S. at 156-57 (examining Quinn's refusal to
answer questions from a Congressional subcommittee in reference to the Communist
Party).
71. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) ("It would be incongruous to have
different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege based on the same feared
prosecution, depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.").
The opinion continues by stating: "Therefore, the same standards must determine whether
an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified." Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
72. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951) (holding the privilege must
be claimed, but failing to provide a proper method to claim the privilege); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (failing to set any clear standard for claiming the privilege,
but ruling the privilege must be claimed).
73. 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
74. See id. at 425 (ruling the witness waived the privilege by testifying, but nonetheless
granting witness immunity under the Sherman Act).
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held the Fifth Amendment did not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily as to matters that may incriminate, and, by volunteering otherwise privileged information, the witness waived the protections of the
Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court stated, "If, therefore, he desires
the protection of the privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the Amendment.""
Several key Supreme Court cases, including Salinas, have cited
Monia.n However, the facts in Monia are distinguished from Salinas."
In Monia, the witness already orally testified in a grand jury proceeding
and was later granted immunity under the Sherman Act." Alternatively,
the facts in Salinas show the defendant simply remained silent in invoking
his Fifth Amendment right.so Moreover, in Monia, the witness could rely
on the Sherman Act when the Fifth Amendment did not justify a claim of
privilege."' The Supreme Court in Monia held although the witness did
not expressly claim Fifth Amendment privilege, because of the Sherman
Act, prosecutors were precluded from bringing charges against the
witness. 82
The Monia decision and other cases-upon which the Salinas plurality
relied-did not instruct how to claim the privilege because in each instance the witness already voluntarily testified in a grand jury proceed-

75. See id. at 427 (writing the Fifth Amendment offers no safeguards against voluntary
testimony).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Rogers, 340 U.S. at 371, 373 (quoting Monia in deeming a claim of the
privilege insufficient because the claim was presented on the witness' second refusal to
answer when she already revealed incriminating facts in her first examination and the witness used the privilege to protect others and not herself); Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.
648, 653-54 (1976) ("In the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes
disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not 'compelled' him to
incriminate himself."); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 420 (1984) (reaffirming the
principle in Monia and Garnerby holding witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were
once said to have "waived" it); Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2174 (2013)
(stating that Monia is well-settled law).
78. Compare United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 424 (1943) (ruling on an issue
involving a witness voluntarily testifying and later trying to claim immunity from the selfincriminating testimony), with Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (examining
an issue involving an individual attempting to claim his right at the onset of the incriminatory question by not answering).
79. Monia, 317 U.S. at 426.
80. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-78 (2013) (describing the incidents
that gave rise to the issue).
81. See Monia, 317 U.S. at 430 (granting immunity under the Sherman Act).
82. See id. at 430-31 (ruling the witness has immunity from prosecution by stating,
"[Als the [Fifth] Amendment did not justify a claim of privilege against such remote contingencies, the immunity should be likewise construed not to reach them.").
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ing. 3 In those instances, unlike Salinas, the Supreme Court was not
charged with determining what happens when a witness neither waives
the privilege by voluntary testimony nor expressly claims the privilege;
therefore reliance on those cases could be limited to those instances.84
The decision in Rogers v. United States85 follows Monia in concluding
the witness failed to claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment. 86 After
the disclosing she had been the treasurer for a Communist Party, the witness refused to identify to whom she relinquished control over the
books." The Supreme Court decided an express claim of the privilege
was warranted in determining whom the witness was trying to protect.88
Distinguishing Rogers from Salinas, the witness in Rogers attempted to
avoid incriminating others, not herself, thus the Supreme Court held the
Fifth Amendment would not have initially applied.89 Therefore, the circumstances requiring an express claim of privilege in Monia was warranted, while circumstances in Salinas did not necessitate a need for
express invocation.9 0
Unlike Rogers, the Supreme Court in the two Blau v. United States"
opinions broadened the scope the privilege.9 2 In Blau, if a court deter83. See id. at 425 (indicating the defendant had previously testified under oath before
a grand jury); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 368 (1951) (concerning the claim of
the privilege after the defendant previously testified before a grand jury); Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 422 (1984) (centering around statements already made and arguing
the Fifth Amendment makes the statements inadmissible).
84. See Monia, 317 U.S. at 430-31 (differing from Salinas as the privilege was said to
have been waived instead of not properly being claimed).
85. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
86. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (quoting Monia in deeming a
claim of the privilege insufficient because she already volunteered incriminating evidence
and the witness was only attempting to protect others not herself).
87. See id. at 368 (recounting the facts of the case in which the individual refused to
disclose another person related to the Communist Party).
88. See id. at 375 (requiring a claim of privilege in order to determine if real danger
existed).
89. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931) (holding that the privilege
against self-incrimination "is solely for the benefit of the witness"); United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (regarding the Fifth Amendment privilege as a personal one that
benefits only the person claiming the privilege).
90. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (writing no inference should be drawn in Rogers-as there should have been in Salinas-because of the need to ascertain who the witness was attempting protect).
91. 340 U.S. 159 (1950); 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
92. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 160 (1950) (sustaining the use of the Fifth
Amendment to protect any testimony establishing a link to evidence used in prosecution of
the individual testifying); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (reaffirming the
same principle). But see Rogers, 340 U.S. at 372-73 (constricting the Fifth Amendment by
using a broader view of the doctrine of waiver).
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mines testimony furnishes a link in the chain of evidence against an individual, the Fifth Amendment should still apply.9 3 The Rogers Court
rejected this principle in the Blau cases because the witness already revealed a fact, thus waiving the privilege to any later facts that are related.9 4 In Rogers, the Supreme Court used broad construction of the
doctrine of waiver in circumventing the principle established in Blau."
While other Constitutional protections must be knowingly waived and
not merely inferred, as in the case of Rogers, broad view of the doctrine
of waiver has reduced Fifth Amendment privilege to a second-rate position.96 In broadening the doctrine of waiver, the Supreme Court constricted the Fifth Amendment privilege's applicability by holding
admission of some facts automatically established waiver as to all related
questions." This Fifth Amendment interpretation does not conform to
previous decisions on waiver of Constitutional rights."
Unlike the more constricting Rogers interpretation, the Supreme Court
chose a more liberal interpretation in Hoffman v. United States," reinforcing principles of both Blau cases. 0o Hoffman was another Supreme
Court case of the early 1950s that involving privilege against self-incrimination in federal grand jury proceedings."o' In Hoffman, a witness re93. See Blau, 340 U.S. at 159 (setting forth the principle that testimony forming a link
to incriminating evidence is still protected by the Fifth Amendment).
94. Rogers, 340 U.S. at 372-73 (deciding Blau was not on equal footing because "disclosure of a fact waives the privilege as to details").
95. See id. at 374 (determining the witness "had already 'waived' her privilege of silence when she freely answered criminating questions relating to her connection with the
Communist Party").
96. See id. at 377-78 (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the broad construction of the
doctrine of waiver concerning Constitutional amendments); see also Smith v. United
States, 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949) (construing the doctrine of waiver narrowly by holding,
"waiver of constitutional rights, however, is not lightly to be inferred. A witness cannot
properly be held after claim to have waived his privilege and consequent immunity upon
vague and uncertain evidence.").
97. See Rogers, 340 U.S. at 377-78 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting the slippery slope
created by broadening the doctrine of waiver).
98. See Smith, 337 U.S. at 150 (holding Constitutional waivers should not lightly be
inferred).
99. 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
100. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (applying a broad construction of the waiver to constrict a witness' use of privilege); see also Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951) (liberalizing the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment by
applying the protection to not only incriminating answers, but also to any answer creating a
link to support a conviction); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 160 (1950) (setting forth
the principle that testimony forming a link to incriminating evidence is still protected by
the Fifth Amendment).
101. See, e.g., Blau, 340 U.S. at 159 (involving a witness who claimed Fifth Amendment protection during a federal grand jury proceeding); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
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fused to answer any questions regarding affiliation with the defendant
because he might incriminate himself.10 2 The government challenged this
assertion, arguing lack of real and substantial danger of self-incrimination.103 The Supreme Court reversed the district and appellate courts
which held such protection should not be afforded because possible admissions did not trigger Fifth Amendment protection. 1 0 4
Quoting Blau, the Supreme Court held, "The privilege afforded not
only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ...
but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant."o The Supreme Court reasonably limited broad interpretation of the privilege to instances in which
the witness has reasonable cause to expect danger of prosecution by
answering.106
Understanding the difficulty in ascertaining whether a defendant is reasonably apprehensive of answering, in Hoffman, the Supreme Court
opined, "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.""0 ' This language implies a court needs to consider the peculiar circumstances of the case-as told by the facts in evidence-in determining
whether to sustain the privilege.os Applying this principle to the circum332, 333 (1951) (providing Fifth Amendment protection to a witness in a grand jury proceeding); Rogers, 340 U.S. at 371 (deciding a witness in a grand jury proceeding failed to
claim the privilege of the Fifth Amendment).
102. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 481 (detailing the examination of the witness in which
he refused to answer questions regarding his relationship with an individual who was being
charged with various crimes, including violations of the customs, narcotics and internal
revenue liquor laws of the United States, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and
other federal criminal laws, and conspiracy to commit all such offenses).
103. Id. at 482.
104. See id. at 484 (recanting the court of appeals' decision to affirm the conviction
because the relationship between the possible admissions answering the questions and the
proscription of the pertinent federal criminal statutes were not closely related enough to
find a real danger in answering).
105. See id. at 486 (incorporating Blau's language, which expanded the scope of the
Fifth Amendment to include answers furnishing a link in the chain of evidence); see also
Blau, 340 U.S. at 160 (setting forth the principle that testimony forming a link to incriminating evidence is still protected by the Fifth Amendment).
106. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (confining the privilege to
instances in which there is reasonable cause to fear repercussions from answering directly).
107. See id. at 486-87 (looking to the implications of the questions to conclude
whether to sustain the privilege by determining whether the answer might result in
incrimination).
108. See id. at 487 (resolving that a trial judge in analyzing a claim of privilege under
the Fifth Amendment should incorporate "his personal perception of the peculiarities of
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stances in Salinas, it could be reasonably argued from the nature of the
questions that the privilege should be sustained. However, the question
of how the privilege needed to be claimed remained unanswered.
One of the more influential cases cited in Salinas and referred to
throughout this Comment is Quinn v. United States.'09 Quinn is influential because it dealt directly with the question of whether an individual
properly claimed the privilege against self-incrimination." 0 Quinn also
involved questioning possible Communist Party affiliations."'
In Quinn, three witnesses refused to answer questions posed to them
by a congressional committee." 2 The first witness expressly refused to
answer on First and Fifth Amendment grounds,' 1 while the last witness-Thomas Quinn-did not expressly invoke Fifth Amendment protection; rather, he adopted the same position as the first witness.1 4 The
district court did not find the claim of privilege sufficient for activating
Quinn's Fifth Amendment protection."' The Supreme Court later upheld the claim's sufficiency, stating, "[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary
in order to invoke the privilege."" 6 This decision is cited in many
cases'' 7 and was very influential to the Supreme Court's decision in
Salinas.'"

The privilege against self-incrimination is not construed as strictly in
Quinn as it is in Rogers."' In Quinn, the Supreme Court called for libthe case as by the facts actually in evidence") (citing Ex Parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C. C.
S. D. Ohio 1896)).
109. Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
110. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955) (granting certiorari to determine whether a witness sufficiently claimed Fifth Amendment protection).
111. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 368 (1951) (developing from an
investigation into the Treasurer for the Communist Party of Denver); Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 159, 159-60 (1950) (reversing a guilty of contempt judgment against Patricia Blau for refusing to answer questions regarding her employment with the Communist
Party of Colorado); Blau v. U.S. 340 U.S. 332, 332-33 (1951) (overturning a finding against
Irving Blau for refusing to answer questions regarding his wife's whereabouts and his employment with the Communist Party of Colorado).
112. Quinn, 349 U.S. at 157.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 158.
115. Id. at 159.
116. Id. at 164.
117. E.g., Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (citing Quinn v. United States
throughout); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 n.30 (1966) (citing the same).
118. See generally Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (referring to
Quinn v. United States several times throughout the opinion).
119. Compare Quinn, 349 U.S. at 164 (extending Fifth Amendment protection even
though Quinn used vague terms), with Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 368 (1951)
(declining to extend Roger's Fifth Amendment protection on grounds the privilege was not
invoked and thus waived).
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eral construction of the privilege as narrow construction would completely reject its original objective.' 2 0 The Supreme Court went so far as
to say that an express claim was unnecessary, holding "the fact that a
witness expresses his intention in vague terms is immaterial so long as the
claim is sufficiently definite to apprise the committee of his intention."I2 1
The Supreme Court then placed the burden of deciphering an ambiguous claim of the privilege on the person conducting the questioning by
instructing them to either accept the individual's claim of the privilege "as
is" or further inquire as to whether the individual intended to invoke the
privilege.' 2 2 Quinn closely paralleled Justice Black's dissent in Rogers by
taking a similar liberal view that the Fifth Amendment should be construed "broadly on the view that compelling a person to convict himself
of a crime is contrary to the principles of a free government" and "abhorrent to the instincts of an American"12 3 and not diminishing the Fifth
Amendment by treating it as "merely a shield for the guilty[.]"1 2 4
C.

Silence as a Weapon: Griffin v. California and its Progeny

While one aspect of the Salinas opinion focuses on claiming privilege,
another question Salinas revisits is whether commenting on a defendant's
silence should be used against them.125 Griffin v. Californial2 6 established the principle that a comment by the trial court or prosecution on a
defendant exercising his right burdens the defendant's privilege under the
Fifth Amendment by causing the jury to draw adverse inferences.12 7
In creating the no-adverse-inference rule, Justice Douglas wrote:
It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. It
is said, however, that the inference of guilt for failure to testify as to
facts peculiarly within the accused's knowledge is in any event natu120. See Quinn, 349 U.S. at 162 (declaring a liberal construction in Fifth Amendment
cases is particularly warranted).
121. Id. at 164.
122. See id at 164 (establishing it is "incumbent on the committee either to accept the
claim or to ask petitioner whether he was in fact invoking the privilege").
123. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision to apply the doctrine of waiver broadly to find the witness
could not be afforded Fifth Amendment protection).
124. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955) (regarding the Fifth Amendment as more than just an armor for the guilty).
125. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the principle that the prosecution or a trial judge cannot comment on a defendant's silence at trial).
126. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
127. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (highlighting how a defendant's
silence may unfairly create "evidence" against them in the jury's eyes).
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ral and irresistible, and that comment on the failure does not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a Constitutional

privilege.12 8

The Supreme Court later expanded Griffin, requiring that a judgeupon request of the defendant-must instruct the jury that it may not
consider sua sponte the defendant's silence as evidence of guilt.129 While
the federal rules of privilege are mostly stated in common law, the noadverse-inference rule is codified at the state level.13 0
However, the Griffin exception has been heavily criticized.13 , The Salinas concurrence resurrects disapproval of Griffin and argues the no-adverse-inference rule in irreconcilable with the Fifth Amendment.13 2
While the plurality does not address this question, the concurring opinion
would have rejected Salinas' claim, regardless of whether he properly
claimed the privilege.133 By eliminating aspects of the privilege entirely,
this approach extends much further than the plurality in limiting the 5th
amendment privilege.
However, Miranda would soon drastically alter the Fifth Amendment
landscape. 134 Responding to Miranda, the Supreme Court held allowing
counsel to comment on silence following Miranda warnings being provided is contrary to the principles Miranda sought to protect.135 Some
128. Id.
129. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) ("A state trial judge has the
constitutional obligation, upon proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will
give evidentiary weight to a defendant's failure to testify.").
130. See TiEx. R. Evio. 513 (codifying the rule that a claim of a privilege cannot be
commented on by the judge or counsel).
131. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (opposing the Court's holding in Griffin); see also Mitchell v. United States, 526
U.S. 314, 331 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the defendant did not have protection
from adverse inferences that resulted from her refusal to testify). Justice Thomas, also
dissenting, calls for the reexamination of Griffin and its progeny because it shows "cause
enough to resist its extension." Id. at 341-42.
132. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing an adverse inference made by the jury does not compel a defendant to testify
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment).
133. See id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (denying Salinas'
claim in spite of whether the privilege was successfully invoked).
134. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 436 (1966) ("[S]tatements obtained from
defendants during incommunicado interrogation in police-dominated atmosphere, without
full warning of constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been obtained in violation
of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.").
135. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1986) (determining that the
use of defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence by the prosecution violated due process); see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) ("[lIt would be fundamentally unfair
and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.").
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courts have even expanded this Constitutional protection to include silence after arrest even before Miranda warnings had been provided. 3 6
These cases bolster those in favor of broadening Griffin's no-adverse-inference rule.
D.

Miranda v. Arizona and its Importance to the Decision in Salinas

Before Miranda,the Supreme Court guaranteed an individual the right
to have an attorney present during police questioning,137 protected an
individual against adverse inferences drawn from a refusal to testify,
and incorporated the Fifth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment.'3 9 The Supreme Court insisted Miranda did not create new jurisprudence but applied long-recognized principles in different settings.14 0
Miranda intended application of the Fifth Amendment principles to a
custodial interrogation setting.'4 1 Briefly stated, Miranda ensures Fifth
Amendment protection to statements made during a custodial interrogation by requiring the individual be warned of the right to counsel and the
right to refrain from answering questions.' 4 2 The burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate it has taken the necessary procedural safeguards in
securing a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination by assuring the
defendant was given full and effective warnings. 4 3 Chief Justice Warren
wrote statements previously volunteered do not deprive an individual
from the right to counsel or to refrain from answering other questions. 1 4 4
136. See Sanchez v. State, 707 S.W.2d 575, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("[A] defendant may not be impeached through the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence since such
impeachment violates the defendant's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
and also since such impeachment is improper from an evidentiary standpoint.").
137. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (holding an accused individual
is permitted to consult an attorney when the investigation turns accusatory).
138. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (innovating the no-adverseinference rule).
139. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (holding the Fifth Amendment's
Self-Incrimination Clause is incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus applies to the states).
140. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (beginning with the premise
that this holding is "not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings").
141. See id. at 461 ("[A]ll the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal
compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning.").
142. See id. at 444-45 (promulgating what would become known as Miranda
warnings).
143. See id. at 444 (requiring the prosecution to demonstrate it has given full and
complete warnings to the defendant in order to admit statements as evidence).
144. See id. at 445 ("The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter con-
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This section examines Miranda'sgoals in determining whether such goals
are still present in our jurisprudence today and how Miranda compares
with the Supreme Court's Salinas decision.
In Miranda,the Supreme Court ensured the suspect was not at a significant disadvantage from the interrogator.14 5 At the time of the Miranda
decision, an environment existed in which abuse of suspects or witnesses
by law enforcement in procuring information was commonplace. 14 6 Acknowledging the inherently threatening environment of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court instituted safeguards ostensibly offsetting
disadvantages placed on those subject to interrogation.'
Miranda warnings serve three purposes.14 8 First, with the recitation of
warnings, a suspect becomes more aware of his Constitutional rights.' 4 9
Furthermore, the warnings remind the interrogator of the Constitutional
rights the suspect retains.150 Finally, the warnings ensure statements received by police are made voluntarily and without coercion, increasing
likelihood of admission at trial. 5 1
Miranda adopted a strict view of the doctrine of waiver by placing "a
heavy burden ... on the government to demonstrate the defendant know-

ingly and intelligently waived the privilege against self-incrimination and
the right to retain or be appointed counsel."1 5 2 By constricting the doctrine of waiver, the Supreme Court in turn broadened application of the

sents to be questioned."). But see Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951) ("[The
witness] had already 'waived' her privilege of silence when she freely answered criminating
questions relating to her connection with the Communist Party.").
145. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (instituting what are now known as the Miranda
warnings); see also Roscoe C. Howard, Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why
It Remains Vital Today, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 685, 685 (2006) (identifying the need for the
Miranda warnings to place the interrogator and suspect on the same playing field).
146. See White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532 (1940) (recounting the nightly whipping of
a defendant in order to procure a confession); see also Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
237 (1940) (asserting mental coercion violates the Fifth Amendment, as well as physical
coercion); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936) (detailing the whipping and
abuse forced upon a defendant until he confessed to a crime).
147. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 -58 (recognizing the effect of custodial
interrogation).
148. See Hammack, supra note 12, at 425 (identifying the purpose of the Miranda
holding).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 426.
151. Id. at 427.
152. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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Fifth Amendment, thus continuing liberal interpretation of privilege from
the 1800s.153
Appreciating Miranda is important in understanding Salinas because
Miranda adopted previous law centered on a defendant's testimony at a
judicial proceeding and extended the same privileges in the context of a
police interrogation.' 54 Miranda adhered to the Supreme Court's liberal
interpretations of the past,'5 5 upholding liberal construction by broadly
applying the privilege against self-incrimination.156 Therefore, the burden of the Miranda warnings is considered by investigators while solving
a crime. Miranda was promulgated because unclear holdings of the past
must be reconciled against current interrogation tactics and persuasion. 157 Miranda's critics note the obvious controversy in the duty of investigators to gather information from individuals while
contemporaneously being required to warn individuals of their right to
remain silent. 5
While Miranda invites criticism, the ruling was nevertheless necessary
when considering routinely abusive and torturous interrogations. 159Mi
randa offered solutions for those being interrogated by advising them of

153. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (giving the Fifth Amendment a liberal interpretation); see also Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955)
(continuing the liberal construction of the Fifth Amendment).
154. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 479 ("We are satisfied that all the principles embodied
in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during
in-custody questioning.").
155. See, e.g., Counselman, 142 U.S. at 582 (applying the liberal construction); Quinn,
349 U.S. at 162 (continuing the liberal construction of the Fifth Amendment); see also
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-61 (1966) (citing the liberal constructions by the
Supreme Court).
156. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (instituting the previous constructions of the Fifth
Amendment to apply to current interrogation settings).
157. Compare Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951) (determining the witness "had already 'waived' her privilege of silence when she freely answered criminating
questions relating to her connection with the Communist Party"), with Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 444 ("The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned.").
158. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 1095 (scrutinizing Miranda's decision by pointing
out the contradiction in having the police perform a function contrary to their wish that the
suspect cooperate).
159. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82 (1936) (describing the whipping and physical abuse performed on a defendant until he confessed to a crime); White v.
Texas 310 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1940) (recounting the nightly whipping of a defendant in order
to force his confession); Chambers v. Florida 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (stating mental coercion
violates the Fifth Amendment in addition to physical coercion).
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their rights.'6 o The Supreme Court's implementation of this broadened
view continued the liberal Fifth Amendment constructions of the past.16 '
Whether Miranda'sprinciples are still alive today is questionable and, if
so, whether Salinas disproportionately shifted the burden back to the
individual.
III.

SPLIT DECISION: EXPLORING THE PLURALITY, CONCURRING, AND
DISSENTING OPINIONS OF SALINAS v. TEXAS

Such liberal construction is particularly warrantedin a prosecution of
a witness for a refusal to answer, since the respect normally accorded
the privilege is then buttressed by the presumption of innocence accorded a defendant in a criminaltrial. To apply the privilege narrowly
or begrudgingly-to treat it as an historicalrelic, at most merely to be
tolerated-is to ignore its development and purpose.162
Drawn from the historical framework of the right against self-incrimination involving claiming the privilege,' 6 3 use of silence against a defendant, 16 4 and the application of Fifth Amendment rights in custodial
interrogations,' 5 dissecting Salinas decision is ripe for dissection. Salinas
is the latest in a recent line of cases departing from earlier, more liberal
interpretations.' 6 6 Berghuis v. Thompkins'6 7-decided three years prior
to Salinas-held an invocation of the right against self-incrimination
160. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446, 479 (recognizing abuse during custodial interrogation and instituting safeguards to protect individuals); see also Howard & Rich, supra note
145 (noting Miranda warnings can serve to equalize the interrogator and the suspect).
161. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446, 479 (continuing a liberal construction of the Fifth
Amendment by writing, "in this Court, the privilege has consistently been accorded a liberal construction"); see also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (giving the
Fifth Amendment a liberal interpretation).
162. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
163. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951) (holding the privilege
must be claimed, however, failing to outline the proper manner in which to claim the privilege); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427, (1943) (failing to set for any clear standard for claiming the privilege, but ruling the privilege must be claimed or it is waived);
Quinn, 349 U.S. at 164 ("[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the
privilege.").
164. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding the trial court's and
the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's failure to testify violated the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment).
165. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461 (applying all principles inherent to the Fifth
Amendment to compulsion exerted by investigators during custodial interrogations).
166. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (ruling a claim of Fifth
Amendment protection must be unambiguous); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630
(2004) (failing to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of physical
fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements).
167. 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
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should be unambiguous.16 8 Thompkins established the standard for invoking the right to counsel and applied it to Fifth Amendment rights. 169
The Supreme Court determined the invocation of the Constitutional right
against self-incrimination must be unambiguous, while alternatively ruling an implicit waiver is effective when admitting a suspect's statement
into evidence.17 0 Three years later, the Salinas plurality continued in disproportionately shifting the burden on the individual to claim Constitutional rights,17 1 while significantly reducing the prosecution's burden of
establishing waiver. 17 2
A.

Salinas' Plurality Opinion: The Express Invocation Requirement

Salinas started as an investigation into the deaths of two brothers in
Houston, Texas."'7 Salinas agreed to allowing ballistics testing on his
shotgun and agreed to non-custodial questioning.174 Salinas remained silent when asked if his shotgun shells would match those found at the
scene.17' The officer then asked additional questions, which Salinas answered.'7 6 After subsequent conviction, Salinas appealed, asserting the
use of his silence by the prosecutor as evidence against him violated the

168. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381 (ruling a claim of Fifth Amendment protection
must be unambiguous).
169. See id. ("[B]ut there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel."); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)
(instituting the standard for asserting the right to counsel).
170. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381, 384 (holding while claiming the privilege must be ambiguous, an implicit waiver of the right is effective to allow an individual's statement into
evidence).
171. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (requiring a specific
invocation of the Fifth Amendment).
172. See, e.g., id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (2013) (ruling knowledge of forfeiture is not
an element of the forfeiture of the privilege); Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (holding an implicit
waiver is sufficient in denying an individual their Fifth Amendment rights). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("[A] heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964) (recognizing the need for a knowing and intelligent waiver);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("[I]t has been pointed out that 'courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."').
173. Salinas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
174. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013).
175. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013) (describing the interrogation).
176. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013). The fact the defendant answered all of the
officer's questions except the one that would incriminate him was considered evidence that
he may have been guilty. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013).
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Fifth Amendment.17 7 The Salinas plurality held Salinas' "Fifth Amendment claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination in response to the officer's question.""17
The plurality relied on the principle that those desiring the privilege
"must claim it.""'7 The plurality also recognized "no ritualistic formula is
necessary in order to invoke the privilege." 1 80 However, by requiring express invocation of the Fifth Amendment, the plurality created a ritualistic formula."'
In reaching this contradictory conclusion, the plurality cited Hoffman,
reasoning an express invocation is required by the government because
the government must be able to affirm that the defendant's answers will
not be self-incriminating.' 82 Considering this foundational opinion, Hoffman further elaborated, "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident
from the implications of the question ....
In Hoffman, the Supreme
Court placed the burden of determining whether the privilege was invoked on the trial judge-not the individual. 8 4

177. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013).
178. Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
179. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,
427 (1983)). Myriad precedent requiring an invocation of the right against self-incrimination exists. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951) ("If petitioner desired the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, she was required to claim
it."); United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (asserting that the privilege must be
claimed).
180. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (quoting Quinn v. United
States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955)).
181. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15 (interpreting the plurality's opinion in Quinn by
writing "[a] defendant must speak in order to claim that right and likely must do so with
exactly the type of 'ritualistic formula' that the court has previously rejected").
182. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (citing Hoffman v. U. S., 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951)); see also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 6002 when stating: "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the
basis of his privilege against self-incrimination .... "). Therefore, the government must be
notified of why there is a refusal to comply. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448
(1972). Kastigar presents another unique circumstance in which express invocation may be
warranted, but the circumstances that would invoke this principle lie outside of the facts of
Salinas and outside of the scope of this comment. Id.
183. Hoffman v. United States 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
184. See id. at 489 (easing the burden on the individual and stating, "[ijf this result
adds to the burden of diligence and efficiency resting on enforcement authorities, any
other conclusion would seriously compromise an important constitutional liberty"). The
Supreme Court also cites United States v. White in stating: "[t]he immediate and potential
evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crime." United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
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The plurality also utilized Roberts v. United States in ruling silence
alone does not claim the privilege.' 85 However, Roberts is distinguishable
from Salinas.'8 6 In Roberts, the defendant already voluntarily confessed
to the allegations and received harsher sentencing because he withheld
further cooperation in naming his heroin suppliers."' On appeal, the defendant justified his refusal to cooperate on the basis of physical intimidation and the right to remain silent."
The Roberts's court held, "The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing."'
However, the Supreme Court did suggest an inference is permissible "[a]t least where the
Government had no substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, the privilege may not be relied
In Salinas, there was a
upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion."'
substantial reason to believe the defendant's answer would be incriminating.' 9 1 Contrary to this implication,' 9 2 the plurality only recognized two
such instances in which express invocation is unnecessary' 9 3 when the
no-adverse-inference rule promulgated in Griffin applies' 9 4 and when the
individual is subjected to involuntary compulsion from governmental coercion.' 9 ' The plurality determined neither applied under Salinas'
facts. 96 The plurality held the Griffin exception did not apply because
the privilege creating an unqualified right to refuse testifying at trial is not

185. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181 (2013) (citing Roberts v. United States,
445 U.S. 552 (1980)).
186. Compare id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178 (2013) (surrounding circumstances involving
a suspect who was brought in for questioning in a murder), with Roberts v. U. S., 445 U.S.
552, 554-55 (1980) (revolving around an individual who had already voluntarily confessed
but did not disclose the names of his suppliers).
187. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 554-55 (1980).
188. Id. at 559.
189. Id.
190. See id. (inferring if there is a substantial reason to believe the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, express invocation may then not be necessary).
191. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (recounting the
facts of case). The nature of the question of whether Salinas' shotgun shells would match
the shells recovered at the scene of the murder and the fact that Salinas' silence was eventually used against him establishes the question called for incriminating information.
192. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 559.
193. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179-80 (2013) (acknowledging two
specific exceptions to the requirement of specific invocation).
194. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
195. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (instituting proper safeguards to protect against involuntary coercion).
196. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (concluding the two exceptions for express invocation did not apply).
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equivalent to the right during custodial interview.' To wit, such distinction departs from Miranda where the Court was, "[S]atisfied that all the
principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning."'
Although Miranda stands for the proposition that Fifth Amendment
privileges in the trial setting should be instituted into custodial interrogations,199 Salinas was not subjected to traditional custodial interrogation
because he voluntarily accompanied officers and was free to leave at any
time.200
Another exception occurs where a witness fails to invoke the privilege
because governmental coercion caused involuntary forfeiture and the witness is subjected to inherently compelling pressures. 201 However, stipulating Salinas was not subject to a custodial interrogation and he was free
to leave at any time, the plurality held this exception did not apply
either. 202
Miranda was instituted specifically to protect persons under compulsory custodial interrogation; therefore, the plurality was correct in
stressing Miranda's inapplicability.2 0 3 However, Miranda did not form
the primary basis for the Salinas ruling. 204 Rather than deciding the
threshold issue of whether the Fifth Amendment protects pre-custodial

197. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (2013) ("Because petitioner had no comparable unqualified right during his interview with police, his silence falls outside the Griffin
exception.").
198. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461.
199. See id. (determining all the privileges applicable to formal settings should be applied to custodial questioning as well).
200. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (illustrating how Salinas
voluntarily accompanied the investigators to the station for questioning and "was free to
leave at any time").
201. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (noting the inherently compelling pressures that
work to undermine individuals' will to resist and to compel them to speak where they
would not otherwise do so freely); see, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-82
(1936) (describing the physical abuse forced upon a defendant until he confessed to a
crime); White v. Texas 310 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1940) (recounting the nightly whipping of a
defendant in order to procure a confession).
202. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (holding petitioner cannot
benefit from this principle because it is undisputed that his interview with police was
voluntary).
203. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (describing how a custodial interrogation exacts a
heavy toll on individual liberty); see also Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178
(2013) (agreeing the interview was noncustodial and Miranda warnings were not given).
204. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (basing its holding on the determination of whether the claim was successful invoked, not on whether pre-Mirandasilence
can be used as evidence against a defendant).
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silence,20 5 the plurality decided the Fifth Amendment requires an express
and unambiguous invocation of the rightwhile holding forfeiture of the
right need not be made knowingly.2 0 6
B.

Sparring against Silence: The Concurring Opinion's Disapprovalof
the Griffin Exception

"Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character." 2 0 7
With the plurality and dissent arguing over express invocations and inferences, the concurring decision attempts to simplify the issue. 208 The
concurrence argued the Fifth Amendment protection does not extend to
pre-custodial silence. 2 0 9 The concurrence alludes to the idea that it would
vitiate the no-adverse-inference rule and allow silence in any situation.2 10
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas staunchly oppose the no-adverse-inference rule.2 11 In penning the concurrence, Justice Thomas criticized the
Griffin exception by implying Griffin was merely a form of Lochnerism, 2 12 instituting a desirable policy decision.2 13 Justice Scalia has previously ridiculed the Griffin exception as "a breathtaking act of sorcery,"
transforming policy into Constitutional mandate.2 1 4 Moreover, the concurrence revives its disapproval of the exception as a whole,2 15 finding no
Fifth Amendment foundation because any adverse inference, which may
205. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing the
plurality avoided the issue of the admissibility of pre-custodial silence).
206. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2178, 2183 (2013) (ruling the invocation must be express and forfeiture need not be made knowingly).
207. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923).
208. Salinas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (determining even if Salinas had invoked the privilege, the Griffin exception should not be extended to include pre-custodial silence).
209. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring).
210. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing the Griffin exception has no grounds in the Fifth Amendment); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
15 (describing the concurring justices' desire to overrule Griffin).
211. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _,

133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)

(criticizing the Griffin exception); see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Griffin's history as dubious); see also id. at 343
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (lobbying for reconsideration of Griffin).
212. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing the Fifth Amendment does not give a basis for the Griffin exception); see generally MICHAEL S. ARIENs, AmitRICAN CONST.fUTIONAi LAW AN) HISTORY 377 (2012) (referring to the term "Lochnerizing" or "Lochnerism" as an attempt by a court to employ its
personal values in its decisions).
213. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 343 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (seeing Griffin as a policy
choice the Judiciary found desirable at the time).
214. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Griffin).
215. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(asserting the Griffin exception is not grounded in the Fifth Amendment).
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be drawn from silence, is insufficient in compelling a defendant's testimony.2 16 A staunch adherent to textual and historical interpretations of
the Constitution, Justice Scalia has written: "[T]he text and history of the
Fifth Amendment give no indication that there is a federal constitutional
prohibition on the use of the defendant's silence as demeanor
evidence. "217
Justice Thomas has argued commenting on silence does not compel a
defendant to testify because adverse inferences do not penalize a defendant simply for exercising his Constitutional rights. 2 18 Comparing use of
silence with other courtroom tactics, Justice Thomas wrote:
Prosecutorial comments on a defendant's decision to remain silent at
trial surely impose no greater "penalty" on a defendant than threats to
indict him on more serious charges if he chooses not to enter into a plea
bargain-a practice that this Court previously has validated. 21 9
The concurrence's attempt at simplifying the issue merely contorts a
fifty-year-old decision widely accepted by the legal community. 220
C. A Shield Against Silence: Salinas' Dissenting Opinion
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer argued the Fifth Amendment
should be interpreted to protect pre-arrest silence; thus, expressly invoking the privilege was unnecessary. 221 The dissenting opinion reasons that
using a defendant's pre-arrest silence compels the individual to be a witness against himself, stating:
To permit a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's constitutionally
protected silence would put that defendant in an impossible predicament. He must either answer the question or remain silent. If he
answers the question, he may well reveal, for example, prejudicial
facts, disreputable associates, or suspicious circumstances-even if
he is innocent. 222

216. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (deciding the use
of silence does not compel an individual to witness against himself); see Mitchell, 526 U.S.
at 342 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[C]omments or inferences do not truly 'penalize' a
defendant.").
217. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218. See id. at 342 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the dissent in Griffin, because making comments and drawing inferences does not harm the defendant).
219. Id.
220. See id. at 330 ("The rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant's
rightful silence has become an essential feature of our legal tradition.").
221. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2189 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (determining Salinas need not expressly invoke his privilege).
222. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Proscribing use of silence by the prosecution, the dissent adhered to
Miranda'soriginal principle "prosecution may not . . . use at trial the fact

that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation."2 2 3
The dissent illustrates a perverse dichotomy in remaining silent. 2 24 If
an individual remains silent, the prosecution may use that as a sign of
guilt. 2 25 However, if a defendant "opens the door" in in justifying his
silence, the prosecution can utilize the testimony as in inquiring upon
other prejudicial information.22 6 Based on this premise, the dissent believes using silence compels individuals to testify against themselves by
forcing choice between incrimination through speech and incrimination
through silence.227 Juxtaposition with the plurality's determination, in
which there are only two instances when express invocation is not required,22 8 the dissenting opinion surmises there are only two instances
requiring express invocation.22 9
Justice Breyer determined expressly mentioning the Fifth Amendment
is only required when the facts involving the use of silence do not give
rise to an inference of claiming Fifth Amendment protection, and when
the questioner has a special need to know whether the defendant is relying solely on Fifth Amendment protection. 23 0 The dissent found support
for its proposition that express invocation is not always required in a line
of cases in which Fifth Amendment protection applied-even when a suspect answers some questions-but is silent as to others.2 3 ' The dissent
223.
468, n.37
224.
fendants'

See id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2189 (2013) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
(1966)) (emphasis added).
See id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2189 (2013) (identifying the conundrum in using desilence against them).

225. Id. at
226. Id. at

_,
_,

133 S. Ct. at 2186 (2013).
133 S. Ct. at 2186 (2013).

227. Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2176 (2013).
229. See id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2186-87 (2013) (identifying two instances in which an
express invocation is required).
230. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2190 (2013) (outlining when invocation of the privilege is
expressly required).
231. See Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding a defendant's refusal to reenact his version of how his wife was shot could not be used as affirmative evidence of his guilt in his prosecution for first degree murder, even though the
defendant spoke freely and voluntarily about the incident after police read the defendant
his Miranda rights); United States v. Scott, 47 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If a suspect
does speak, he has not forever waived his right to be silent."); United States v. Canterbury,
985 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993) ("This court has recognized that when a defendant answers some questions and refuses to answer others, or in other words is 'partially silent,'
this partial silence does not preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process
rights."); see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1975) ("[W]hile it is true that the
Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such
assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol16/iss4/5

28

Villaneuva-Le: When Silence Requires Speech: Reviving the Right to Remain Silent

2014]

WHEN SILENCE REQUIRES SPEECH

863

cited several cases in illustrating when a form of express invocation was
necessary: due to ambiguous circumstances or because the privilege was
used to protect others.2 32 A line of cases was also cited in which the
individual was not required to expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment
even though the circumstances behind their refusal to testify were
unclear.2 33
Because individual circumstances were dispositive in each case, the dissent concluded circumstances dictate use of the Fifth Amendment, not
statements. 234 Following Quinn's language, finding no ritualistic formula
is necessary,2 35 the dissent applied a relative standard in determining
whether circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference the silence
stemmed from exercising the Fifth Amendment.23 6 Weighing the dangers
of both views of express invocation, the dissent concluded the problems
with Salinas's bright-line express invocation rule outweigh problems associated with the more vague circumstances standard.23 7

would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.").
232. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234, 240 (1980) (deciding the prosecution may use the fact that the defendant waited two weeks before coming forward to
authorities to weaken the credibility of his self-defense claim); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 371, 373 (1951) (deeming a claim of the privilege insufficient because the witness
was using the privilege to protect other individuals and not herself); Roberts v. United
States, 445 U.S. 552, 554 (1980) (describing an individual who had already voluntarily confessed, but did not disclose the names of his suppliers).
233. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _ 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2188 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(describing a possible third set of cases in which no express invocation was required despite
ambiguous circumstances); see, e.g., Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967) (upholding a Fifth Amendment claim that was not expressly invoked because the officers were
faced with a decision to either forfeit their jobs or incriminate themselves); Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 28-29 (1969) (determining an express claim unnecessary when compliance with transfer tax provisions of Marijuana Tax Act would have exposed the defendant
to prosecution under state narcotics laws); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 803-04
(1977) (refusing to sign a waiver form was sufficient to invoke a Fifth Amendment claim
where the assertion would cause a political official to lose his job).
234. Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2189 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
235. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955).
236. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2189 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (calling for a standard that infers waiver from the circumstances surrounding the defendant's claim).
237. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2191 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the administrative problems accompanying the plurality's approach are even worse).
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SALINAS' WAKE: EXAMINING THE PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS TO CURRENT FIFTH AMENDMENT LAW

"The immediate and potentialevils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on
society in the detection and prosecution of crime."238
A woman matching a suspect's identity is brought in for questioning
because her vehicle matches the description of one used in a crime.
Knowing she is innocent and figuring she will just explain the mistake, the
woman avoids the cost and hassle of an attorney. Following traditional
interrogation methods, investigators initially create an ere of confidence
the woman is guilty.2 39 The investigators press, hoping the woman agrees
with their own preconceived notion of what happened.2 40
Responding to the persuasive, perhaps intimidating environment, the
woman relies on her lay knowledge of Miranda warnings and remains
silent. Indeed, she "knows" whatever she "says" will be used against her.
Instituting Salinas' plurality and concurrence view, the innocent suspect
would have unwittingly waived her privilege, potentially exposing herself
otherwise inadmissible evidence.2 4 '
The plurality's requirement of express invocation and the concurrence's refusal to extend the Griffin exception past the courtroom is incredibly problematic for laypersons. By requiring an express claim to the
privilege, the plurality has squarely placed the onus on everyday individuals. Limiting the no-adverse-inference rule inflicts additional damage because not only will an individual fail to invoke the privilege through
silence, he will also have such silence used against him.2 42
On the Ropes: The Harms of an Unbalanced System
Miranda admonishes individuals have the right to remain silent and
anything they say can be used against them.24 3 Consequently, by the language of the warnings in and of themselves, individuals do not know how
to invoke the right to remain silent. Also, contrary to the statement's
A.

238. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
239. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 450 (1966) (describing the interrogation techniques commonly employed by law enforcement officers).
240. See, e.g., id. (illustrating techniques used by criminal investigators).
241. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (requiring express invocation of the right); id. _, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing
with the principle that the prosecution or trial judge cannot comment on a defendant's
silence at trail).
242. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2177-78 (2013) (describing how silence was used
against a defendant).
243. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (outlining a template for what are now known as
the "Miranda warnings").
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implication, there is no notice given that silence still may be used against
individuals whether they say anything or not. 2 4 4
Express invocation harms those already disadvantaged by an unfair
system.24 5 Requiring direct and assertive statements in an intentionally
intimidating environment is unjustly discriminatory. For example, express invocation does not consider adverse effects it bears on female sus24
pects.246 Researchers conclude female speech patterns tend toward
indirect and deferential speech. 24 7 If law enforcement utilizes this discrepancy to the disadvantage of female suspects, millions of women could
be exposed to the standard's harmful effects. 2 48 The poor or uneducated
are similarly disadvantaged, as more educated, affluent individuals may
have a better understanding of how to expressly invoke their rights.24 9
The same disadvantages also apply to non-English speaking suspects and
those with mental disabilities.25 0
Informing suspects as to their rights but offering no guidance on how to
claim those rights is a fundamental problem presented by Salinas' express
invocation requirement.2 5 1 Individuals are forced to rely on their often
legally incompetent knowledge of the judicial system in exercising their
basic Constitutional rights. Further exacerbating this problem is the fact
most silence or other implicit claims are ignored, with no attempt at reas-

244. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-78, 2184 (2013) (detailing the manner in which the defendant's silence was used against him).
245. See generally Ainsworth, supra note 22, at 320 (detailing the disadvantages of
express invocation on women).
246. See id. at 262 (exploring the manner in which "a legal doctrine preferring direct
and unqualified assertions of the right to counsel takes into account the speech patterns of
women as well as other powerless groups").
247. See id. (indicating women lean towards more indirect and deferential speech patterns); Robin Lakoff, Language and Woman's Place, 2 LANGuACn IN Soc'v 45, 56 (1973)

(describing how women may lean towards politeness by writing, "An overt order (as in an
imperative) expresses the (often impolite) assumption of the speaker's superior position to
the addressee, carrying with it the right to enforce compliance, where as with a request the
decision on the face of it is left up to the addressee.").
248. See id. (recognizing the potential disadvantage women face in interrogations).
249. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 824 (asserting the privilege should not just afforded
to the educated); see also Hammack, supra note 12, at 435-36 (noting advantages to those
who are educated).
250. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460 (1994) ("Requiring a clear assertion
of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who because of fear, intimidation,
lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons will not clearly articulate their right to
counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present."); Mowad, supra note 19
(recognizing the potential dangers to disadvantaged persons).
251. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 409-14 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("Miranda warnings give no hint that a suspect should use those magic words, and
there is little reason to believe police-who have ample incentives to avoid invocationwill provide such guidance.").
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serting the right.2 52 In fact, suspects may see confession as the only way
of the ending an interrogation.25 3 Forcing an express requirement overly
burdens normal, unsuspecting individuals; however, the savvy repeat offender, fully aware of the system's intricacies, remains unhindered.
Another significant flaw in the Salinas rule is as Supreme Court decisions increasingly constrict 5th Amendment rights, waiving these rights
254
grows easier.
Again, the right to remain silent can be waived implicitly, unknowingly, and unintelligently. 2 5 5 This plurality view has been
criticized as subordinating the Fifth Amendment relative to other Constitutional protections. 2 56 Of course, this shift greatly benefits the prosecution. By also requiring knowledge of which Constitutional amendment
must be invoked, suspects must now contemporaneously tip toe through
the judicial process for fear of relinquishing their rights without saying a
single word.
When the privilege is not expressly invoked, and therefore implicitly
waived, then a third strike is dealt to suspects when their silence is used
against them.25 7 As discussed, Griffin's progeny paved the way for denying use of silence during custodial interrogations; however, using silence
in pre-custodial situations has still not been established.2 58 Miranda pro-

252. Hammack, supra note 12, at 439.
253. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 472-73 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting a defendant may
see further objection as futile and may view confession as the only way "out").
254. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) (ruling forfeiture of
the privilege need not be done knowingly); Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 (holding an implicit
waiver is sufficient in denying an individual their Fifth Amendment rights). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("A heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel."); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964) (recognizing the need for a knowing and intelligent waiver);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that
we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights."').
255. See Salinas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) (ruling forfeiture of the
privilege need not be done knowingly).
256. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the broad construction of the doctrine of waiver concerning Constitutional
amendments); see also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (construing the doctrine
of waiver narrowly by holding, "Waiver of constitutional rights, however, is not lightly to
be inferred. A witness cannot properly be held after claim to have waived his privilege and
consequent immunity upon vague and uncertain evidence.'").
257. See Salinas, 563 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2174 (2013) (describing how silence was
used against a defendant).
258. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding the trial court's and
the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's failure to testify violated the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment); see also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290

(1982) (determining the use of defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence by the prose-
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tects against the inherent compelling pressures of custodial interrogation,
but when a witness freely submits to questioning, those pressures are not
as compelling. 259 However, Salinas' circumstances changed drastically,
compelling circumstantial analysis in determining whether the environment was inherently compelling.2 60
B.

Tipping the Scales: Possible Solutions to Competing Interests
"If this result adds to the burden of diligence and efficiency resting on
enforcement authorities, any other conclusion would seriously compromise an important constitutional liberty."26 1

Miranda presented a quintessentially traditional dilemma-resolving
intrinsic conflict between protecting Constitutional rights and enabling
proper investigation by law enforcement. The Miranda plurality warns
allowing silence hinders the prosecution in determining whether such a
claim is legitimate; others argue the most reasonable interpretation of silence is that suspects are invoking their right to do so. 2 62
Investigators and prosecutors can easily claim statements as ambiguous. Judicial economy will be furthered reduced if the government continues splitting hairs and expending needless time guessing individual fact
patterns. Better directing investigators, prosecutors, and suspects is the
solution. Regardless of whether new standards are adopted, the
problems presented in this Comment evidence need for updated Miranda
warnings accurately reflecting both recent Supreme Court holdings and
evolving interrogation and prosecution tactics. Such warnings should not
only apprise individuals of the right to remain silent, but should also offer
specific guidance in invoking the privilege. Accordingly, updated warncution violated due process); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (ruling "it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial"); Sanchez v.
State, 707 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ("A defendant may not be impeached
through the use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence since such impeachment violates the
defendant's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, and also since such impeachment is improper from an evidentiary standpoint.").
259. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (noting the inherently compelling pressures in custodial interrogations, which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely).
260. See Salinas, 563 U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2186 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for an inference of the right to remain silent if the circumstances are unambiguous);
Doyle v. Ohio 426 U.S. 619 (1975) ("[In] such circumstances, it would be fundamentally
unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to
impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.").
261. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1951).
262. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 803 (arguing invocation is the most reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statement).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University,

33

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 16 [], No. 4, Art. 5

868

THE SCHOLAR

[Vol. 16:835

ings should notify individuals that silence, not just statements, could be
used against them if they fail to properly invoke the privilege.
Guidance can be found in past Supreme Court precedent.26 3 In Quinn,
Justice Harlan wrote that an expression in vague terms is immaterial as
long as questioners knew of their suspect's intentions.2 64 Further, "It
then became incumbent on the committee either to accept the claim or to
ask petitioner whether he was in fact invoking the privilege."2 65 Quinn
suggests if suspects claim the right ambiguously, then questioners should
specifically inquire whether or not the Fifth Amendment is being invoked, immediately notifying all parties whether or not the privilege has
been successfully claimed. Therefore, if suspects remain silent to questioning or ambiguously imply they wish not to answer, investigators
should ascertain at that moment whether suspects are invoking their Fifth
Amendment rights. Congruent to Miranda's proposition, "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 2 6 6 This
practice clarifies whether to cease questioning or allow suspects time in
formulating answers.
Hoffman is also instructive. Justice Clark wrote for the majority: "The
trial judge in appraising the claim must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in
evidence."2 6 7 In instances where investigators do not ascertain whether
suspects are invoking their right-either because they do not infer the
ambiguous claim or simply refuse to further inquiry-trial judges should
then have discretion handle the matter based on their perception of the
particular facts of a case. 26 8 Instituting a bright line standard of express
invocation removes judicial discretion from judges tasked with determining such issues and places the burden of deciphering legal nuances on
common individuals. The Salinas plurality insists silence can merely be
269
u
expressly
Yet iif suspects
the result of suspects fashioning false stories.

263. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 (1955) (establishing it should become "incumbent on the committee either to accept the claim or to ask petitioner whether
he was in fact invoking the privilege").
264. See id. (upholding Fifth Amendment protection even though it was claimed using
vague terms).
265. Id.
266. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
267. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951).
268. See id. (finding a trial judge, in analyzing a claim of privilege of the Fifth Amendment, should incorporate "his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the
facts actually in evidence").
269. See Salinas v. Texas, 563 U.S. -, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) (detailing alternative reasons justifying a suspect's silence).
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invoke the privilege, stalling while they concoct a believable story is still
an option.
Consider again Hoffman's language: "To sustain the privilege, it need
only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result,"27 0 and Robert's determination "[t]he Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least where the Government had no substantial reason to
believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating, the
privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion."27 ' Courts can sustain a privilege claim implicitly from the questions, considering whether the prosecution had a substantial reason to
believe the disclosures are incriminatory.
V.

CONCLUSION

Updated warnings are needed to not only inform suspects of their
rights, but to guide them into properly exercising those rights. Suspects
must be warned they can be penalized for their silence, and if they wish to
claim the privilege against self-incrimination, they must do so expressly.
While this places a heavier burden on law enforcement, it is the officers,
investigators, and prosecutors who are specifically trained in our legal
system, not the common individual. Past liberal constructions favoring
the rights of individuals must be kept alive today, because if the Fifth
Amendment can be jeopardized, so too could other Amendments. 2 7 2

270. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87 (looking to the implications of sustaining the
privilege by determining whether the answer might be dangerous because it could result in
incrimination).
271. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980).
272.
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